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AbstraetmWe consider stationary discounted eterministic dynamic programs with bounded re- 
wards, and provide sufficient conditions on their data (reward and transition functions) to ensure 
that the outcome functions (value and optimal policy selections) have some desirable structure. 
For the value function, the properties ofinterest are monotonicity, continuity and concaviW. For the 
optimal policies, monotonicity and slngle-valuedness are investigated. In both cases, monotanicity 
is the nutln question, and lattice progranu~in£ techniques are used. Our results generalize earlier 
I~nrlln~ reported for specific models of dynamic optimization, including optimal growth theory and 
resource management 
1. PRELIMINARIES 
1.1. Introduction 
We consider discounted stationary dynamic programs with a deterministic transition law and 
partial structure on the basic data. Our main concern is to investigate which minimal assump- 
tions are needed on the reward and transition functions--such as concavity, monotonicity and 
supermodularity--to guarantee that the value function and the optimal policy, in turn, have 
some desirable properties. For the former, such properties may be concavity, continuity and 
monotonicity, while for the latter, single-valuedness, continuity and monotonicity are of interest. 
This work is motivated primarily by problems in economic dynamics, namely optimal ex- 
ploitation of renewable/depletable resources by a monopoly owner. Such problems often possess 
mathematical formulations which are identical to those of optimal growth models and of reservoir 
control models. Consequently, the results presented here may be partially viewed as generaliza- 
tions of previously known results in the three separate literatures listed above. 
On the other hand, our results are presented in a rather general and abstract framework, 
encompassing many other dynamic programming models arising in economic theory and opera- 
tions research. While our approach to the problem at hand rests mostly on lattice programming 
techniques [1], some of the results also use standard concave programming arguments. In fact, 
some parallels between the two optimization forms, discussed in [1], are nicely brought out in 
Theorem I here, for instance. 
We consider only infinite-horizon dynamic programs, and prove all our results in the associated 
framework, without recourse to finite-horizon iteration. An alternative approach would naturally 
consist of proving the various results we provide for the finite-horizon version first, and then 
taking limits as the horizon tends to infinity. In fact, as long as the infinite horizon value and 
optimal policy functions are limits of their finite-horizon counterparts, the results presented here 
will be valid. 
The first author would like to thAn~ Professors M. Sobel and W. Lovejoy for several helpful conversations onthe 
subject of this work. 
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The paper is organised as follows. First, we conclude this section with a brief summary of 
lattice programming theory. In Section 2, we give a general description for the dynamic programs 
considered in this study and state the three main theorems together with all associated corollaries. 
Proofs constitute Section 3, and Section 4 is devoted to an application of our results in economic 
dynamics. Finally, Section 5 gives a conclusion and literature review. 
The material of Section 4 provided the impetus for the present work. While most of the results 
presented there are already known, they were obtained under less general assumptions, including, 
for instance, assumptions ofdifferentiahility of the data functions (reward and transition) and of 
interiority of solutions. These known results in economic dynamics provide a nice illustration of 
our general theorems (of Section 2), which, nevertheless, are general and not model-bound. 
1.~. Mathematical Background 
This section provides a summary of all lattice-theoretic notions and results used in this paper. 
Details can be found in [1]. 
A set S with a partial order >_s, (i.e., a reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation) 
is a lattice if the sup z V y (or least upper hound) and inf z A y (or greatest lower bound) of any 
two elements z and y are both in S. A lattice S is complete if the sup and inf of any collection 
of elements of S are in S. 
A real-valued function f on S is supermodular if f ( z  A y) + f (z  V y) >_ f (z)  + f(y), Vz, y E S. 
If S = H 2, this is equivalent to f(zl, Yl) - f(zl, 7]2) ~_ f(z2, Yl) - f(z2, Y2), if (El ,  Yl) __.~ (Z2, Y2). 
If f is twice di~erentiable, this is also equivalent to 02f/~zOy ~ O. f is isotone (resp., antitone) 
if z _~ y implies f (z )  ~_ f(y) (resp., f (z)  ~_ f(y)), for all z, y in S. 
Let P(S) he the set of nonempty subsets of S and L(S) the set of nonempty sublattices of S 
(So is a suhlattice of S if z V y E So and z A y E So, Vz, y E So, where V and A are defined 
in S). Define an order >_p on P(S) by: X >p Y if X and Y are subsets of S, for which z E X, 
y E Y "-~ z V y E X and z A y E Y. L(S) is partially ordered by _>p. An isotone (resp., antitone) 
function F, from a partially ordered set T into L(S), is called ascending (resp., descending). 
Stated in symbols, F is ascending if z >_T Y, a E F(z) C S, b E F(y) C S (with F(z) and F(y) 
sublattices of S) implies a V b E F(z) and a A b E F(y) (where A and V are taken in S). 
Also F: T --* L(S) is expanding (resp., contracting) if z _>T Y implies F(z) D F(y) (resp., 
F(z) C F(y)). 
We are now ready to state a weak vemion of Topkis' Theorem, which is used repeatedly in the 
sequel (for a proof, see [1]). The underlying topology on A here is the interval topology, which 
in the case of R, is the usual topology. 
TOPKIS' THEOREM. Let f be a real-valued supermodular ( esp., submodular) function on A = 
((z, y) : z E X, y E A=), where X is a nonempty partially ordered set, A is a lattice; A= E L(A) 
for each x E X,  and A= is ascending (resp., descending) on X. Assume &rther that A= is compact 
and f (z ,  .) is upper-semi-continuous l~oreach z E X. 
Then Y(z) -- {y: y E A=, y E argmax f (z ,y )} /s  ascending (resp., descending) in z, and for 
each z E X, Y(z) has a greatest element ~(z) and a least element y_(z), both of which are isotone 
(reap., antitone) on X. 
We conclude this subsection with the following easily proved observation, used without refer- 
ence in our results. 
FACT. Let A= be a compact sublattice of R, for each z E S C R. If an A= is ascending (resp., 
descending) and expanding (reap., contracting), then a_ = a~ = rain{A=} (resp., a - a= = 
max{A=}) is independent of z. Furthermore, if A, is also convex for each z E X, then A,  = 
[a, c(z)] (resp., A= = [c(z), ~]) with c being an isotone (resp., antitone) function on S. 
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESULTS 
A discounted deterministic stationary dynamic program consists of a tuple of elements 
(S, A, A,, r, f, ~) with the following meaning: 
(i) S is the state space, assumed to be a sublattice of R. 
(ii) A is the action space, also a sublattice of R. 
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(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
The 
(A1) 
(A2) 
(A3) 
The 
As, a sublattice of A, is the set of all feasible actions when the state is s. A = UcsA, 
r: Gr A, --. R is the reward function (where Gr A, __ {(s, a): a E A,}. 
f :  Gr As --~ S is the (deterministic) transition function, giving the next state as a function 
of the current state and of the action taken. 
is a discount factor: 0 _~ ~ < 1. 
following assumptions are in effect for all the results in this paper: 
There exists C 6 H such that 0 _~ r(s, a) ~ C, for all (s, a) E S x A,. 
The multifunction s -* Ae (defined from S to 2A/{~b}) is continuous (i.e., both upper and 
lower semi-continuous) and compact-valued. 
The functions r and f are jointly continous on S x A,. 
dynamic program can be stated as follows: 
V(s) - supE/~ '  r(s,,a,), when so = s, st+z = f(st,at), at E A,,, t = O, I, . . . .  
t=O 
Let B(S) be the Banach space consisting of all bounded real-valued functions on S, endowed 
with the sup norm. It is well known that the value function V is the unique fixed-point of the 
contraction mapping T defined by [2]: 
T: B(S) --* B(S) 
v --* sup {r(s,a) + ~v[f(s,a)]]. 
aEA, 
It follows from (A1) that V(s) < C (1-~) -z - K. Furthermore, a stationary policy a* : S --* A, 
such that a*(s) E A, is optimal if and only if it achieves the maximum in the above supremand 
when v is replaced by V. 
By standard Maximum-type theorems, V is continuous and the multifunction 
g(s) = a) + v[.,"(,, a)]}. 
aEA, 
is upper-semi-continuous (u. .c.), as a consequence of Assumptions (A1)-(A3). 
In fact, these assumptions could be weakened considerably without affecting our results at all. 
However, since they are all satisfied in the appfications we have in mind, we prefer to keep them 
for the sake of a simpler presentation. The interested reader can refer, for instance, to [3,4] for 
a list of less restrictive assumptions. In particular, (A1) could be removed to allow for certain 
models in queueing and inventory control with stochastic transitions. Finally, we remind the 
reader that there is no need for any measurability considerations, since the transition law is 
deterministic [5]. 
Furthermore, since all the appfications we have in mind involve subsets of H as state and 
action spaces, we state all our results in H. However, our results are valid in general Euclidean 
spa~s, and in fact, more generally, in partially ordered state spaces and lattice action spaces 
(endowed with the interval topology). To stress this fact, we keep the general terminology of 
lattice theory (see [1]) even though it is well known, e.g., that any (compact) subset of R is a 
(complete) sublattice of H. 
Before proceeding to the statement of our results, we set some final notation. Let a = sup A, 
a = infA, and for a fixed s 6 S, a, = supAj, a_, = infA,. Analogously, let i = supS and 
s_ = inf S. It follows from the compactness of As C I], that ~ and ~ are also in A,. Define a 
multi-function H: S --* 2 s by 
= g(,)). 
It should be understood that H(s) is the point H(s) 6 {H(s)} corresponding to the point 
g(s) E {g(s)} via this definition. 
Finally, let S t be the subset of S consisting of all reachable states under an optimal stationary 
policy, i.e., 
S' = {s 6 S : there exists t 6 S such that s E H(t)). 
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The first theorem gives separate conditions ensuring that the value function V is isotone on 
S and S'. The other two theorems deal with monotone optimal policies. 
THEOREM A. Assume that (A1)-(A3) hold. The following separate statements are true: 
(1) V is isotone on S if f(. ,a) and r(.,a) are isotone on S, and As is expanding. 
(2) V is isotone on f f  if either of the following pa/rs of conditions hold: 
(i) f(s, .) and-r (s ,  .) are isotone; 
(ii) for each s E S, f (s,a,)  = ~ and As is convex; or 
(i') f(s, .) and-r (s ,  .) are antitone; 
(if) for each s E S, f(s, as) = s_, and As is convex. 
THEOREM B. In addition to (A1)-(A3), assume that 
(i) r is strictly concave and f is concave on Gr Aj - {(s,a) : s E S and a E As}; 
(ii) r and f are supermodular on Gr As; 
r(., a) and f(., a) are isotone on S; 
(iv) f(s, .) is antitone on As; and 
(v) As = [0, c(s)], with c: S ---* A, a concave and isotone function. 
Then the value function V is isotone and concave on S, and the optimal policy g is single-- 
valued, continuous and isotone. 
For the next result, f(s, .) is strictly monotone on As, for each fixed s E S, so that if one defines 
y -- f(s, a), then there exists a function h: S × S --~ As such that a = h(s, y), where S is the range 
of f, assumed to be a sublattice of R. Also, define Yj - {y E S : y = f(s, a), for some a E As}, 
for each s E S. 
The following result involves the data functions r and f, as well as the function h (which may 
be viewed as a parametric inverse of f) and the derived correspondance Ys. Assuming smoothness 
of r and f, one may restate Theorem C in a much more transparent and ready-to-use manner: 
see Corollary C 2 (upcoming). 
THEOREM C. /n addition to (A1)-(A2), assume that 
(i) y(s, .) is strictly isotone on As; 
(ii) [(., a) is antitone on S; 
(iii) r[s, h(s, y)] is supermodular in (s, y) E S x S; and 
(iv) ~ is ascending. 
Then, there exists an optimal policy which is isotone on S. 
The following is the other version of Theorem C. 
THEOREM C I. The conclusion of Theorem C still holds if "isotone" and "ant/tone" are inter- 
changed, "supermodular" and "ascending" replaced by "submodular" and "descending," respec- 
tively. 
Note that Theorems C and C' involve only isotonicity of optimal policies and not of V. If, in 
addition, r(., a) is isotone in Theorem C', then V will also be isotone, by Theorem A. 
We now present several important corollaries, numbered according to which theorem they 
follow from. The first three deal with "dual" statements of Theorems A, B and C. 
COROLLARY B1. Assume all the hypothesis of Theorem B hold, with (ii), (iv) and (v), respec- 
tively, changed to: 
(if) r and f are submodular on Gr As; 
(iv ~) f((s, .) is isotone on A,; and 
(v ~) As "- [0, c(s)], with c an antitone concave function from S to A. 
Then, the value function V is isotone and concave on S, and there exists a unique opt~al 
stationary policy, which is continuous and antitone on S. 
COROLLARY C1. Assume all the hypothesis of Theorem C hold, with (i) changed to (~); f(s,  .) 
is strictly antitone on As. Then there exists an optimal policy which is antitone on S. 
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COROLLARY C'1. Assume all of the hypothesis of Theorem ~ holds, except hat f(s,  .) is strictly 
isotone on A. Then there exists an optimal policy which is antitone on S. 
There are other possible "dual" statements o Theorem A and B, the derivation of which is 
left to the reader. We now turn to a smooth version of Theorems C and C', which may be 
more revealing as it only involves the functions r and f,  and not the function h. A similar 
statement could be given for Theorem A and B, but they would only consist of rewriting each 
hypothesis with the differentiable v rsion, using the equivalence ofsupermodnlarity and positive 
cross-partials. We also skip stating a smooth version of the corollaries. In the following result, 
the bracketed statement refers to Theorem C', and the main statement to Theorem C. 
For a function F(z,y),  FI and F2 denote the partial derivatives w.r. to z and y, respectively, 
$'12 the cross-partial, and Fll and F~2 the second partials w.r. to z and y, respectively, whenever 
these exist and are continuous. 
COROLLARY C2. Assume that r and .f are twice continuously ditferentiable, .f2( s, a) > 0 (reap., 
< 0), f l (s ,a)  <_ 0 (resp., > 0), for all (s,a) E Gr A,, Ys ascending (reap., descending), and the 
determinant 
r12 r22 r2 I 
I 
A= f12 f22 f21 _<0, (resp.,~0). 
fl f2 0 C,,o) 
Then there exists an optimal policy which is isotone on S. 
The following result applies to many models of dynamic programming arising in economics and 
operations research, even though it relies on a rather special transition structure. In particular, it
applies to the important class of dynamic optimization problems for which the decision variable is 
simply the next state. Note that, while every dynamic program satisfying our general amumptions 
could be transformed and formulated within this class, an isotone optimal transformed policy 
does not, without further hypothesis, imply an isotone optimal original poficy (see Theorems C
and Ce), although it does imply a monotone optimal state trajectory (since the transformed poficy 
is simply the next state as a function of the current state). 
COROLLARY C3. Assume that transitions are state-independent, i.e., that f depends only on a, 
r is supermodular on Gr As, As is compact and ascending. Then there exists an optima] policy 
which is isotone in s. 
The "dual" statement is the following corollary. 
COROLLARY C4. Assume that .f depends only on a, r is submodular on Gr As, Ao is compact 
and descending. Then there exJsts an optimal policy which is antitone on S. 
We conclude this section with the following important remark on which we do not elaborate 
any further: In Topkis' Theorem, replacing supermodularity b strict supermodnlarity (which is 
defined similarly but with a strict inequality) yields the stronger conclusion that every selection 
(and not just y_ and 9) out of the maximizer Y(s) is isotone. Consequently, the conclusions of 
our monotonicity results would be extended to every optimal policy if strict supermodnlarity s 
assumed in place of supermodularity. A similar observation applies to submodnlarity. 
3. PROOFS 
Each theorem is proved through a series of intermediate l mmas. We start with those estal>- 
lishing Theorem A (Part(I), then Part (2)). 
LEMMA A1. The space M = {v: S --~ R +, v isotone and 0 <_ v(.) <_ K} endowed with the 
uniform metric, is complete. 
PROOF. M is a norm-closed and uniformly bounded subset of the Banach space B(S) of all 
bounded functions S --* R with sup norm. Let (v,) be a Cauchy sequence in M. By completeness 
of B(S), there is a v E B(S)  such that sup Ivn(s) - v(s)] --+ 0. But then, by closedness of M, v 
is also in M. | 
LEMMA A2. I f  v E M, then Tv  E M. 
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PROOF. Let v ~ M, and sl _ s~. Then, since r(., a) and f(., a) are isotone, 
~(,~, a) + ~ ~[f( , , ,  a)] _> ~(s~, a) + # ~Lf('~, a)]. 
Taking suprema, over a E A,I in LHS and over a E A,2 in RttS, and using the fact that A, 2 C A,t, 
it follows that Tv(s l)  >__ Tv(s~). Also, if r(.) <_ K - C/(1-/3),  it is obvious that Tr(.)  < K. | 
PROOF OF THEOREM A, PART (1). The map T: M --, M is easily shown to be a contraction, 
following standard arguments in dynamic programming theory (see, e.g., [6]). M is complete. 
Hence, it has a unique fixed point V E M, which is the value function of our dynamic program. | 
PROOF OF THEOREM A, PART (2'). We have to show that H(sl) ~ H(s~) implies V[H(sl)] ~_ 
V[H(s~)], for all al, s~ in S. Proceed by contradiction, and assume that H(sl) _> H(,~) but 
V[H(*I)] < V[H(s2)], for some sl and s2 in S. Then f[sl,g(sl)] >__ f[s2,g(s~)]. By condi- 
tion (2)(ii'), f ( s~,a , t )= _8 _~ f[s~,g(,~)], where ~,~ = sup A,,. By convexity Of A,, continuity of 
f (s l ,  .) and the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists b in A,t with f (s l ,  b) = f(s i ,  g(s~)), 
and a,t >_ b > g(si). Then 
V(sx) -- r(sx, g(sx)) + fl VLf(al, g(al))] ~ r(al, b) + fl V[f(al, b)] - r(sx, b) + fl V[f(s2, g(a~))], 
a contradiction, since V[f(s2, g(s2)] > V[f(sl,g(si)] and r(st, b) _~ r(sl, g(sl)) by isotonicity of 
r(sl, .). This completes the proof of Part (2'). The proof of Part (2) is analogous and left to the 
reader. | 
LEMMA B1. The space Mc = {r: S --* R +, v continuous, isotone and concave, 0 <_ v(.) ~_ K)  
endewed with the uniform distance, is a complete metric space. 
PROOF. M is a norm-closed and bounded subset of the Banach space C(S) of bounded contin- 
uous real-valued functions on S, with sup norm. Let (rn) be a Cauchy sequence in Mc. By 
completeness of C(S), there exists v E C(S) such that sup Irn(s) - v(s)l --* 0. But then, by 
closedness of Me, v E Me. | 
LEMMA B2. Assume S is a convex set, A, is non-empty for each s E S, Gr A, = {(s,a): s E S 
and a E A,)  is a convex set, and F: Gr A, --* R is concave. Then V(s) = sup{F(s,a): a E A,)  
is concave. | 
PROOF. See [7]. 
LEMMA B3. / fv  E Me, T r  E Me. 
PROOF. If v is isotone, T v is also isotone, by Lemma A2 and condition (iii) of Theorem B. If v 
is also concave, we show now that T v must be concave. 
Consider, for 0 < k < 1, si E S, ai E A,,, i = 1,2, f[Asl + (1 - A)s~, An1 + (1 -  A)a~] > 
A f(s l ,  al) + (1 - A) f(s~, as), by concavity of f. Hence, by isotonicity of v, 
v{f[A sx + (1 - A) s2, A al + (1 -- A) a2]} ~ v{A f(sl, al) + (1 - A) f(s2, as)} 
>_ ~ ~[f(s;, a~)] + (1 - ~) df(s2, as)I, 
by concavity of v. This establishes concavity of vLf(s, a)], and hence of r(,, a) +/~ vLf(s, a)]. The 
concavity of Tv  follows directly from Lemma B2, since Gr A, is obviously a convex subset ofR ~. 
This completes the proof of Lemma B3. | 
pRooF OF THEO~M B. The value function V is the unique fixed-point of the contraction map 
T: Mc --* Me,, (since Mc is complete). So V E Me. Together with condition (ii) of Theorem B, 
and results on composition of functions given in [1], this implies that r(s, a) +/9 VLf(8, a)] is 
supermodular on Gr A,. A, is clearly ascending. Hence, by Topkis' Theorem, the selections 
min{g(a)} and msx{g(s)} are i~tone in a. 
However, the expression r(s, a) + V[f(s, a)] is strictly concave on Gr Ae and A, is convex. 
Hence g(s) is single-valued. Then continuity of g(s) follows from the fact that g is also u.s.c, as 
a correspondence. This completes the proof of Theorem B. | 
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PROOF OF THEOREM C. Since a - h(s,  y), if y - f(s,  a), we have 
V(z) - max{r(s, a) + # V[i(s, a)]} = max{r[s, h(s, y)] + # V(y)}. aEA, yEY, 
By condition (iii), the above maximand is supermodular in (s,y) E S x S. Yj is compact since 
f(s,-) is continuous and A~ is compact. Since 1I, is ascending, it follows from Topkis' Theorem 
that the maximizer y*(.) has selections, ~(.) = max{y*(.)} and _y(.) = min{y*(.)}, which are 
isotone in s. 
Now, define a: S --* A via ~(s) = f(s,a(s)). Then, 81 ~.~ 8 2 implies y(Sl) ---~ f ( s l ,a ($1)  ) ~ 
f(S~, 5(S2) = O(S2). Together with conditions (i) and (ii), this yields 5(sl) >_ a(s~). Noting that 
a(-) is an optimal policy in the original problem completes the proof. | 
PROOF OF THEOREM C ~. The maximand over Y, in the preceeding proof is submodular in 
(s,y) E Gr Y,, and Y, is descending. Topkis' Theorem asserts then that ~(.) - max{y'(.)} and 
y_(') = rain{y*(.)) are antitone on S. 
Define a: S ---* -4 via y_(s) = f[s, fi(s)]. Then sl >_ s2 implies that / Is ,  a(sl)] _< f[s~, &(a2)]. 
Since f(s, .) is antitone and f(., a) is isotone, we must have a(sl) >_ a(a~). This completes the 
proof, upon observing that ~(.) must be an optimal policy in the original problem. | 
For the sake of avoiding repetitive arguments, we leave to the reader the details of the proofs 
of Corollaries A1, B1, C1 and C'I. We continue with Corollary C2. 
PROOF OF COROLLARY C2. We prove the main statement and leave the proof of the bracketed 
statement to the reader. Since y = f(s,a), if and only if a = h(s,y), with f2 > 0, it is readily 
verified that the following identities involving the partial derivatives of f and h hold: 
1 hl(S,y)-- f l(s,a) 
h2(s'Y)-f2(s,a)' -f2(s,a)' 
h12(s ,y )=__  f12(s'a)f2(s,a)- - f22(s,a)f l (s ,a)  
f~(s,a) 
Using these identities, it is immediate that --A is equal to the cross-partial of r Is, h(a, y)] w.r. to 
s and y. Hence, ~(.) = max{y*(.)} is isotone, since --A _> 0 and Y, is ascending. Then, it follows 
from the facts that f2 > 0 and fl _< 0, that ~(.), defined via ~(s) = f(s, d(s)), is also isotone. | 
PROOF OF COROLLARY C3. Since V(s) - max{r(s,a)+ ~V[.f(a)]}, the conclusion follows 
sEA, 
directly from Topkis' Theorem, since the maximand is supermodular on Gr A, and A, is ascend- 
ing. | 
The proof of Corollary C4 is analogous and left to the reader. 
4. APPLICATIONS TO A CLASS OF ECONOMIC MODELS 
The specific models presented in this section constitute part of the original motivation for this 
paper. We provide a general framework in a deterministic setting for problems in one-sector 
optimal growth and optimal exploitation of a natural resource (inluding water reservoir models). 
Most of the results presented in this section have appeared in one form or another, in previous 
studies. A very partial list would include [8,9], and, in particular [10], in addition to several 
earlier studies. Our aim is thus to illustrate our general results through these known models. 
We call the reader's attention to the fact that the minimum and maximum selections (out of 
the optimal policy) being monotone is a second-order condition, which is essentially equivalent 
to the second partial (e.g., using Dini derivatives) of the maximand in the optimality equation 
w.r. to a being negative. We do not elaborate on this further in this study. The interested reader 
is referred to [1] for a brief general overview, and to [11,12] for an extensive discussion along 
these lines in the context of one-sector economic dynamics. Furthermore, the assumptions of 
continuously differentiable data functions will make the isotonicity of optimal policies trict. 
We will consider two well-known models in economic dynamics. The relationship between the 
two models has been extensively established and is not discussed here. 
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~.1. Model I 
The general statement is: 
co 
sup fit ,.(s,, ct), 
t=O 
subject to St.{. 1 ---~ . f (8  t - -  Ct) , and ct E [O, st], t = 0 ,1 ,2 , . . . ,  
where st is the stock and ct the amount consumed at time t, r is a utility or profit function as 
will be specified, and f is the production or growth function. It is always assumed that r and f 
are continuous, f is isotone, f(0) - 0 and there exists £ > 0 such that ~ - f(£),  and / (z )  < z if 
z > ~. Other assumptions will be made when r is specified further. Note that the assumptions 
on f imply that the space, and hence the sets Aa = [0, s], are compact intervals. 
We will refer to the above as Problem P and now define Problem P~ simply by letting y - s -  c, 
that is to say, considering the decision variable as the amount invested rather than the amount 
consumed. The problem becomes 
oo 
sup ~/~t  r(st, st - Yt), 
t=O 
subject to st+l = f(Yt), and yt E [0, st], t = 0,1,2, . . . .  
First, we consider the case where r is a utility function. Here r(st,ct) is the utility derived 
from consuming an amount et at the end of period t and enjoying, for enviromental reasons or 
other use, an amount st of stock during period t. This version of the model seems particularly 
suitable for forestry, livestock, water resources, etc. We assume naturally for this context hat r 
is isotone in both variables. In the sequel, we give a list of other possible (hut not necessarily 
always justified) assumptions and their consequences from our general results. No differentiability 
assumptions are needed for any of our observations to follow. However, we will illustrate some 
properties with their differentiable version, whenever this may enhance clarity or interpretability 
of the conditions. 
(i) If r strictly (jointly) concave, f is concave (hence, easily proved to be supermodular on Gr 
A,), and r is supermodnlar in (s,e), then Theorem B tells us that there is a unique 
optimal stationary consumption policy c*, which along with the value function, is isotone, 
for Problem P. 
(ii) In problem P~, for r ( s ,  s - y) to be supermodular in (s, y) E Gr A,, we need r22 + r21 <_ 0 
(when assuming the second partials of r exist). Then, by Corollary C3, there is an optimal 
investment policy y* which is isotone, or equivalently, c* -- s - y* has all slopes bounded 
above by one. (A special case in which this happens is when r is supermodnlar on Gr A, 
and r(s, .) is concave on A,.) 
(iii) Observations (i) and (ii) above can be combined as follows: if r is strictly concave, f is 
concave, r22 + r21 _< 0 (assuming r is twice continuously ditferentiable), there is a unique 
optimal consumption policy c*, with slopes between 0 and 1. This conclusion holds in the 
special case of interest for which f is concave and r(s, a) = rl(s) + r2(a), with rl and r~ 
both concave. 
In the special case where r is a utility function depending only on c, the discussion above 
simplifies, and the only assumption eeded becomes concavity and isotonicity in c. This is the 
case most written about, particularly in the context of one-sector optimal growth. 
Now we consider the case where r is a profit function. Then r ( s ,  c) = cp(c )  - K(s, c), where 
p(c) is the market price per unit of stock when c units are offered for sale, K(s, c) is the cost of 
extracting e units out of a total of s units of stock. It clearly makes sense to assume r(-,c) is 
isotone, so that by Theorem A, V is isotone in s, since A, = [0, s]. The case by case analysis 
is the same as (i), (ii) and (iii) above, except that the plausibility of the various assumptions 
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is to be re-examined under the new context. With y = s - c, we can also write r(s, y) = 
(s  -- y)p(s - y) - K(s ,s  - y). 
(i) If K is jointly convex and submodular in (s,c), which means that the marginal cost of 
extraction is decreasing in s, f is concave---thus making f (s  - c) supermodular in (s, c)-- 
and the revenue function cp(c) is strictly concave in c, then, by theorem B, V is concave 
and the optimal consumption policy g is single-valued, continuous and isotone in s. 
(ii) r(s, y) is supermodular in (s, y) if K(s, s -  y) is submodular in (s, y) and (s -  y )p (s -  y) 
is supermodular in (s, y). Assuming smoothness, the former assumption is equivalent to 
K21 ÷ K22 > 0 while the latter is equivalent to 2pl(s - y) ÷ (s - y ) f~(s  - y) < 0. In turn, 
the first inequality is implied by supermodularity of K in (s, c) and convexity of K(s, .) 
in c. The second inequality is easily seen to be equivalent to concavity of the revenue 
function cp(c) in c. 
Under these assumptions, Corollary C3 tells us that the max and min of the optimal 
investment policy y* are isotone in s. 
(iii) Putting together Observations (i) and (ii), we conclude that the optimal consumption 
policy g is single-valued, continuous, isotone and has marginal propensity of consumption 
bounded above by one, if the revenue function cp(c) is strictly concave, f is concave and 
K is jointly convex and submodular in (s, c). 
4.~. Model H 
The general statement is: 
oo 
max ~.,  fit V ( Ic,, kt+ l ), 
$=0 
subject o (kt, kt+l) E D, t =0,1 , . . . ,  
where 
(i) 
(ii) 
(~) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
the following interpretations and assumptions are always in effect: 
D is a subset of R~.. 
A point (z, y) E D represents an input stock z and an associated feasible output stock y; 
The utility function V is continuous on D. 
For every z ~ 0, the sections Dx = {y: (z, y) E D} are compact and ascending; 
There exists a maximum sustainable l vel of capital 5: > 0, such that if z > 5: and 
(z, y) E D, then y ~ z; and 
is a discount factor with 0 < ~ < 1. 
With W(k) denoting the value function when the initial capital stock k0 = k, the optimality 
equation for this model is 
w(k) = max{V(k,y) + w(y)}. 
yEDk 
From Corollary C3, the maximum and minimum selections, ~and _y out of the optimal policy 
y* are isotone in k, if V is supermodular on D. Again, if V is strictly supermodular, every 
selection of y* is isotone. 
Furthermore, if V is differentiable and the optimal solution is interior, isotone policies become 
strictly isotone, via a well-known argument [8]. 
Finally, it is of interest to note that while all of our results on this section are essentially known, 
lattice-theoretical methods allow for their derivation under minimal assumptions. In particular, 
concavity of V, convexity of D, smoothness and interiority assumptions are unnecessary. 
5. CONCLUSION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The subject of dynamic programming/Markov decision processes broadly construed evolved 
along two distinct research lines: the mathematical theory (e.g., [5] and references therein) and 
the model-based investigations in economics and operations research (e.g., [13-15]). The present 
paper attempts to generalize, and present in a unified manner, many separate results from the 
latter literature, thus constituting a step towards a theory of structured ynamic programming. 
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The central issue is that of monotonicity of the outcome function (value and optimal policies) in 
deterministic dynamic programming. Different sets of sufficient conditions on the data functions 
(reward and tra n_~ition) are derived. 
Such results may be of use to the applied researcher in several ways. Most obviously, they 
can be applied directly to various given models to establish derived conclusions uch as mono- 
tonicity, concavity, etc. In policy improvement and value iteration procedures, the search for 
optimal solutions may be considerably shortened if one restricts attention to candidate functions 
satisfying additional properties (in particular monotonicity). Finally, our results may also be of 
use in the modelling phase of an economic or operating/physical system as a dynamic program. 
For example, in optimal extraction of oil (see [16]), one may gain additional information on 
the partially known properties of the depletion function (i.e., the tranRition law) from knowing 
a priori  that the optimal extraction policy possesses some properties. 
In additional to the various models studied in the above references, there are some general 
investigations along the lines of structured ynamic programming. Early results appear in [17]. 
Heyman-Sobel [13, Chapter 8] present a general theorem on monotonicity for stochastic dynamic 
programming, and apply it to several different models. There is some overlap between their results 
and ours, in particular Theorem A(1) and Corollaries C3 and C4. However, their main theorem 
does not have a deterministic ounterpart (except in degenerate cases). Lovejoy [18-20] also 
use lattice-programming techniques in Markov decision processes to derive monotonicity results 
(for the value and optimal policy functions), as well as approximation results and computational 
bounds. 
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